Project 03 · Applied · Greensboro Convention & Visitors Bureau

Diagnosing an 89% drop in Instagram reach

Impressions had collapsed year over year, and the easy conclusion (“the content got worse”) turned out to be wrong. The data told a different, more useful story.

Role

Data Analytics Intern

Timeline

Feb 2026 – May 2026

Focus

Social Analytics · Strategy

Filed

May 2026

Read

The problem

On paper, the Bureau's Instagram looked like it was falling apart. Comparing the same window year over year (January 1 to April 17), impressions were down 89% and total engagements were down 83%. The instinct in the room was that the content had simply gotten worse. Before anyone rebuilt the content strategy around that assumption, I wanted to check whether it was actually true.

How I approached it

I pulled the post-level exports from Sprout Social and rebuilt the year-over-year comparison from the ground up, not just the headline impressions number but the metrics underneath it: posting volume, engagements, engagement rate, and impressions per post. The goal was to separate two very different explanations that produce the same drop in reach: a content problem (people see it and don't engage) versus a distribution problem (fewer people see it at all).

Instagram · Jan 1 – Apr 17, year over year
Metric20252026Change
Posts5537−33%
Impressions1,845,959190,874−89%
Engagements60,03210,002−83%
Impressions / post33,5635,159−85%
Engagement rate3.3%5.2%+58%

The finding

The bottom row changed the whole story. Engagement rate hadn't fallen at all. It had improved 58%. The people who saw the 2026 posts were actually engaging with them at a higher clip than the year before. And the 89% impression drop wasn't explained by posting less, either: impressions per post were down 85%, so each post was reaching a fraction of the audience it used to.

The content wasn't the problem. Distribution was. The account had stopped reaching new people; it just kept engaging the ones it still reached.

Digging into what changed, the clearest difference was the disappearance of collaboration posts. The 2025 breakout posts were collaboration-heavy Reels that borrowed a partner's audience and reached 70,000–200,000 accounts each. The 2026 posts were strong creatively (several cleared a 7–10% engagement rate), but without collaborators they were capped at the Bureau's own follower base.

Benchmarking it

To pressure-test that read, I benchmarked the account against two regional peers, Visit Raleigh and Visit Greenville SC. Greensboro had a far smaller follower base, but it was the only one of the three actually growing:

Instagram · follower growth over the reporting window
AccountFollowersGrowth rate
Visit Greensboro30,209+3.96%
Competitor average133,548+0.03%

That reinforced the diagnosis: the audience and the content were healthy. What had gone missing was the distribution mechanism, the collaborations, that put the work in front of new people.

What I recommended

What I took away

The number everyone reacts to is rarely the number that explains what's happening. Splitting reach from engagement rate, one metric measuring distribution and the other measuring quality, turned a panic about “bad content” into a specific, fixable problem about how the work was being distributed. The recommendation was cheaper and more confident because the diagnosis was right.

Deliverables

Tools

Instagram AnalyticsSprout SocialSocial StrategyBenchmarking

This was one strand of a broader internship. See the CRM rebuild case study for the rest.

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